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When the Other Shoe Drops
IS THERE LIFE AFTER THE GROTON SUBMARINE COMPLEX?
BY ARTHUR W. WRIGHT
One shoe hit the floor in the early
1990s, when the Defense Depart-
ment trimmed its submarine orders
from EB following the collapse of the
Soviet Union.  The move to "Low Rate
Procurement" proved not that bad for
the New London-area economy—but
mainly because, about the same
time, the Foxwoods and then the
Mohegan Sun casinos opened, even-
tually adding 20,000+ new jobs to the
region.
Now the second shoe may be
about to drop: the Groton sub base is
back on the BRAC hit list.  The base
survived being on the 1993 list, but
will lightning not strike twice in the
same place?  And even if it survives
again in 2005, southeastern Connect-
icut's heavy economic reliance on sub-
marining warrants a hard look at what
the end of the world—at least the
world as we have known it for a long
time—would look like. 
SIZING UP THE PROBLEM
The New London-Groton area’s
love affair with submarines dates all
the way back to 1868.  Today, the self-
styled “submarine capital of the world”
relies so heavily on building and
deploying submarines that, while the
state and its neighbors might get a case
of the flu if the sub base closed, the
southeast corner of the state could
come down with pneumonia.
Two scenarios (table, next page)
show the extent of the potential mor-
bidity here.  The first (on the left) is
from a report on the contribution of
the Groton submarine complex to the
Connecticut economy, issued by the
DECD in May 2005.  Losing just the
base and the associated submarine
school would punch a 10.5% hole in
the Norwich-New London LMA’s job
total of 134,000 for 2004.  If in addi-
tion EB moved away entirely, the hole
would gape to nearly a quarter—1 in
4—of LMA employment.  An EB cut
only half as big would roughly halve
the total EB-related job loss, and the
damage would drop to 17% of 2004
jobs in the LMA—just over 1 in 6.
Cold comfort, though, to lose “only”
22,900 jobs instead of 31,500.
The foregoing overstates the job
losses likely to be sustained by south-
eastern Connecticut.  The main reason
is that much of the indirect hit from
EB would be borne by the rest of the
state.  One lesson for damage-control
planning would be that, if the Groton
base goes, the entire state will still have
a big stake in somehow keeping EB
where it is.
Aw, they’re just trying to scare us,
you say?  But if DECD was tempted to
overstate its case, it did not seem to do
so.  The agency used a standard tool of
economic-impact analysis—the REMI
Model, which harnesses an intersec-
toral economic model of the state to a
macroeconomic “driver”.  Further,
DECD chose not to report in its exec-
utive summary (far more widely read
than the full report) that using a dif-
ferent model—the U.S. Commerce
Department’s RIMS II—gave indirect
employment effects 18.6% greater
than those from REMI.  And the
DECD cautioned that it did not
expect EB to vanish completely from
Connecticut even if the Navy pulls out
of Groton.
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SO OPEN THE WINDOW, BUT
BEFORE YOU LEAP OUT…
Look at the, less dire scenario for
the end of the world as we have known
it.  There's no getting around the psy-
chological blow, the loss of what the
Courant's Tom Condon has aptly
called "the emotional connection, the
joined identity” between submarining
and the people of Connecticut.  And
some individuals, families and busi-
nesses would definitely be devastated.
But this brighter scenario suggests that
much of the initial pain of losing our
submarine complex would abate, and
many of the job losses and associated
income hits could be reversed.
The key to this different approach
is remembering that people change
their behavior when circumstances
change.  In a REMI world, it’s as
though time stopped, and previous
modes of adaptive behavior—reacting
to changes in weather, the national
economy, technology, what have
you—were simply forgotten.  In fact,
the economic decision-making implic-
it in the REMI model would likely not
survive a major change like the loss of
the Groton sub complex.  Thus, even
though a model run may include a
hypothetical extension into the future,
REMI results are inherently static, or
(better) non-adaptive: simply project-
ed ahead, they are bound to be wrong.
For all we know, the DECD’s projec-
tions might not be dire enough, if (for
instance) large numbers of civilians
committed  hara-kiri because the sub
base closed!
So how would the various actors
involved in the sizeable submarine-
related sector of the Connecticut econ-
omy—the federal government (espe-
cially the military), state and local gov-
ernments, private businesses, and indi-
vidual citizens—likely behave in a
post-submarine world?
First, the DoD’s base-closing
process has become much more sys-
tematically focused on replacing job
losses since the last round of BRAC
closings in 1993.  (For instance, the
DoD no longer demands full market
price for land slated for business use.)
As a result, the land and other physical
assets left behind when a base closes
now get transferred to other uses more
effectively than before.
Second, the State of Connecticut
has a quiver full of programs designed
to assist people in coping with changed
conditions.  And local governments
have had at least mixed success in
shaping economic adjustments.
Third, as my fellow economists are
wont to point out, individuals and
businesses will respond to any and all
incentives that daily life or policy mak-
ers present to them.
What about empirical evidence?
As luck would have it, the Groton sub
complex would not be the first military
base ever to be closed.
BASE CLOSURE IMPACTS,
1971-1994
Mark Hooker and Michael
Knetter (hereafter H&K) constructed
a set of county-level data on the direct
military and civilian job losses due to
57 different base closures completed
during the years 1971-1994.  They
then matched those data against actual
county data on employment, income
and population in prior and in suc-
ceeding years (+ 2 years).  H&K were
thus able to measure the dynamic
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effects of the base closures, inclusive of
behavioral changes both before (in
anticipation of) and after the events.  
They compared county economic
activity following a base closure with
how the county would have fared, had
the closure not occurred and had the
county changed (grown or declined) at
the average rate for the state.  Their
job-loss multipliers thus measured how
many fewer jobs a closure county had
than it would likely have had, absent
the closure. 
All model runs based on the year
immediately preceding the base closure
yielded multipliers less than one—
ranging from 0.40 to 0.57, depending
on the post-closure time horizon
examined (0-4 years).  In plain
English, for every two jobs eliminated
by a base closure, the ultimate effect on
the economy was the loss of about one
job.
Model runs using a 2-years-prior
baseline gave multipliers equal to
about one, except for the 0-year time
horizon (0.69).  Such multipliers are
well below the more draconian figure
of 1.35 that the DECD obtained with
REMI for the Groton sub base and
school.  (DECD’s even larger multipli-
er of 1.69 included EB, whereas
H&K’s data covered only military
facilities.)  Thus, instead of closure-
caused job reductions spilling over into
other sectors, H&K found that, on
average, base closures were associated
with no net indirect effects (a multipli-
er equal to one) or even with some
induced job growth (a multiplier less
than one).
There are some apples-and-
oranges problems.  For one, the
DECD’s estimates apply to the entire
state of Connecticut, while H&K’s
pertained only to the county where a
closed base was located.  County mul-
tipliers are generally likely to be small-
er than those for a whole state.  But to
the extent the economic impact of a
military base is mainly local or region-
al (as opposed to the broader impact
of, say, EB), the comparison will hold
up.  Other studies, using different
methods and aggregate data, have
found output multipliers for govern-
ment consumption and military
investment—the economic essence of
a military base—that are less than
unity. (See also page 10.)
Also, the DECD’s static multipli-
ers are different from H&K’s dynamic
ones, which compare counties’ actual
employment levels following base clo-
sures with what they would have had,
absent the closures, if they'd had job
growth at the same rate as their states.
H&K’s definition is inherent in its
dynamic approach: A military base
doesn’t close in a vacuum.
With these caveats in mind, the
secon scenario suggests what losing the
Groton submarine complex might
mean to New London County if its
experience were to resemble that of an
average county in H&K’s analysis.
Assuming the sub base was to close in
2006, and measuring job change (at
the assumed state rate) either from 1
year prior (2005) or 2 years prior
(2004), the calculated job losses would
range from something over 4,000 in
the year of closure to something over
10,000 by 2010, 4 years out.  In other
words, in the worst case examined,
with 2004 as the baseline, the net
decline in total jobs due to loss of the
base, compared with what the county
would have had given average state
growth, would just about match the
direct job cuts at the base itself.  The
decline would be only about half as
bad if it equaled the H&K figure cal-
culated with 2005 as the baseline.   
NOT THE END OF THE WORLD?
If the Groton submarine complex
is shut down, there will be pain aplen-
ty.  But it could be considerably less
than we might conclude from a non-
adaptive, REMI-style analysis.  At the
same time, the pain would be much
intensified, and felt more widely, if EB
(despite its commendable public
resolve not to change anything, come
what may) decided to trim its opera-
tions at Groton.
Base closures were 
associated with no net
indirect effects, or even
with some induced job
growth.